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INTRODUCTION 
In 1991 Telepoint joined the ranks of notorious marketing failures, like Betamax and the 
Sinclair CS. Thi$ paper will address the issues connected with this failure and the interaction 
with established thinking on high technology marketing, new product innovation and the risks 
associated with entering a nascent market sector. I propose to look at the technology background 
and then chronologically at events from 1989-1991 when three of the four licensed Telepoint 
operators withdrew from the market, the fourth not yet having entered. Problems surrounding 
the product and the service offering will then be examined and reasons for failure identified. 
Finally, I wish to look at the current situation within this sector of the mobile communications 
market and conclude with lessons that can hopefully be learnt from the failure surrounding the 
marketing of this high technology product. 
This paper concentrates on the newest technologies within the mobile communications sector and 
for clarification, the industry standard (CAI), Telepoint’s competing technologies (cellular and 
PCN) and other technologies are described in Appendix 1. Having examined various definitions 
of what constitutes high technology industries/products, for the purposes of this paper, mobile 
communications and Telepoint will be referred to as such, since they meet criteria identified by 
several studies; Moriarty and Kosnik [l] define high technology marketing, as marketing 
situations for technological products where both market and technology uncertainties are high; 
Regis McKenna [2] purports that high technology industries are characterised by complex 
products, large numbers of entrepreneurial competitors, customer confusion and rapid change. 
This certainly fits Telepoint, where the technology was untried, there were too many operators 
for the market and those customers that were aware of the product were confused! A further 
discussion of Telepoint in the context of these definitions can be found on page 17. 
BACKGROUND 
It is easy to confuse Telepoint the service, with CT2 - the underlying technology. CT2 is the 
UK developed standard covering digital cordless telephony (second generation) for use as a 
public system. This basically means the ability to make one-way outgoing calls from a pocket 
sized cordless handset, from within range (loo-150 meters) of a compatible base station or 
“telepoint”. Based on digital technology, calls would be secure from eavesdropping and 
interference free. Base stations were to be installed at shopping centres, railway stations, post 
offices, banks, etc eventually with national coverage and site providers would earn a fee. Like 
cellular, the system relied on radio waves to get from base stations onto the fixed telephone 
network. The aim was to bring low cost mobile communication within reach of the mass market. 
It was said to be cheaper, both in purchase and use, than cellular phones; costs were initially 
comparable to payphones (see Appendix 3) and handsets were smaller and lighter than cordless 
domestic phones - but it quickly became apparent that the disadvantages soon outweighed the 
“selling” points. Operators invested millions of pounds to gain only a few hundred subscribers 
and three of them ceased operations in 1991 with massive losses. 
Over the past four years the UK mobile telecommunication market has seen buy-outs, shake- 
outs, mergers and closures and today bears little resemblance to what was envisaged when four 
Telepoint licences were issued by the DTI in January 1989. 
” Telepoint is the way ahead, it has the ability to profoundly change the way we 
regard telephones and telecommunications services”. May 1989 [3] 
” Telepoint has the image of being a total flop - it seems to be dead in the 
water”. JUIIULII’!~ 1991 [4] 
These quotes, less than two years apart are by telecommunications analysts. Telepoint’s early 
promise and its disastrous demise illustrates the rapid turn-round which has been the inevitable 
result of rushing to market too quickly - a classic case of how not to introduce a new 
technology. Today with no Telepoint service operational, the future for mobile 
telecommunication is confused and uncertain. 
CHRONOLOGY 
The basic origin of Telepoint was in PA’s Technology Division in 1978 and their report for the 
Eurodata Foundation (1981) on the future of mobile telecommunications in Europe confirmed 
the need for a low cost, mass market mobile telephony service. The demand came from two 
sectors, public telephone users (dissatisfied with the service) and some mobile communication 
customers, who wanted a less expensive, less congested service. The market potential was 
thought to be huge. In 1981 PA provided a working demonstration of their original system to 
BT, who felt it did not fit their marketing plans, so it was decided not to take the concept 
further at that stage. At around this time, the scene for today’s telephony market was being set, 
BT lost its monopoly when Mrs Thatcher’s first government intending to liberalize the market, 
licensed Mercury Communications to provide a competing fixed link public telephone network. 
Since then Mercury has eaten into BT’s market share especially in the business sector. Also at 
this time two cellular companies, Cellnet (owned by BT and Securicor) and Vodafone (Racal) 
were enjoying a monopoly of the mobile telephone market. Their initial success meant that 
demand exceeded capacity and, too often, many subscribers failed to make their connection. 
Ferranti had bid for and lost its opportunity to operate a cellular licence but had come to the 
same conclusion as PA - there was a real need in the market for more mobile technology and so 
they funded PA to work on the concept. 
Development of the enabling technology (CT2) led to improved performance in new digital 
equipment and Telepoint, the service or system concept, would allow operators to use this 
technology, install an infrastructure, sell the hardware and exploit what was thought to be a 
mass market. Since this form of “mobile” telephony did not fall under existing licences, OFTEL 
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(the industry watchdog) decided that a new licence would be required to operate it. ‘Thus in 
September 1988, the DTI launched a “competition” to licence potential operators and invited 
applications. In order to balance the need to introduce competition and achieve economies of 
scale, whilst still taking into account the amount of business that the market was at the time 
expected to support, the Government wanted more than two but no more than four operators. 
One concern was that funding for a venture of this size was going to be a problem and that four 
could still be too many, another was that licencees could be driven to either join forces (as 
subsequently happened) or overcharge in an attempt to obtain a return on their investment. 
The original prediction was that several million people were expected to be in the mobile phone 
market by the mid-1990’s, attracted by Telepoint’s cost advantage, especially over the more 
expensive cellular services. In January 1989, Consultants MZA predicted a Telepoint user figure 
of 2.5 million by 1995 [5], while BYPS forecast was 3.6 million by 1995 and 13 million by the 
end of the century. But experience has belied the optimism - at the time of the three operating 
companies’ withdrawal in 1991 they had less than 10,000 subscribers between them. [6] 
MARKET ENTRY STRATEGIES OF THE OPERATORS 
In many high technology industries, alliances and partnerships are becoming the norm and the 
variety of alliances reflects a multitude of motives. They can take many forms and can be seen 
as a way of spreading risk, increasing knowledge, enhancing effectiveness and utilising 
competencies in order to improve positioning and ultimately gain market leadership. In the 
mobile communications sector, these alliances have taken the form of organisations grouping 
together initially for opportunistic reasons, to bid for operating licences - in effect forming rival 
consortia. Rising R SC D costs and the speed of technological change, mean that it is increasingly 
difficult, even for large companies, to succeed on their own. But whilst allowing the sharing of 
skills, expertise and technology, these business alliances appear by no means stable (see 
Appendix 2 Overview of the Telepoint and PCN Markets). 
Neilson’s work [7] suggests that firms can indeed enhance their competitive performance by 
entering into various forms of collaborations but as in mobile communications, Kogut’s research 
[8] shows that few joint ventures or other collaborations last beyond six years and most last less 
than four. With Telepoint and PCN, major players quickly left the sector, sold out to existing 
participants or to those seeking entry for other strategic reasons (Hutchison) whilst others have 
merged (or tried to, like Mercury and BYPS). 
In January 1989 four consortia (from eleven applicants) BT, Mercury, Ferranti and BYPS were 
granted 12 year licences to operate Telepoint services but the slow roll-out and take-up rate, 
lack of market research and massive infrastructure investment made it most unlikely that all 
four could succeed. It was stipulated that the systems had to be on approved CT2 apparatus and 
carry outgoing calls only. 
BT, Mercury and Ferranti quickly launched with individual equipment, three different kinds of 
handsets, three types of base stations - all incompatible, whilst BYPS preferred to sit on the 
sidelines apparently waiting for the introduction of the CA1 standard before launching. Three 
launched in 1990 but have subsequently withdrawn from the market due to the low numbers of 
subscribers attracted. (See Table below). 
LAUNCH 
DATE 
ENTRY STRATEGIES PROBLEMS CEASED 
SERVICE 
Sept.1989 First onto the market: BT undertook a repsir programne on 
11 Alternative to poyphones; peyphOf=; 
‘honepoint largerted price sensitive users; Too few base stations; act 1991 
dote (0) Built on being market leader After * year, and only 1000 subscribers 
in fixed phone network and ST’s ET decided on a relaunch, with a 
reputation. prcmotional spend of 13 million, lower 
mass market mobile commmication. prices and smsller handsets. Note (b). 
PHONEPOINT withdrew service with 3300 
base stations and just 800 subscribers 
for an investment of over EZS million. 
Launched uith incompatible equipment. 
ERRANT I OH.1989 Followed ST onfo market; Base stations Limited to around the M25; July 1W 
onephone Had developed original CT2 concept; Target market served by cellphones; 
Initially targetted business users; Handset dubbed the “Ferranti brick”; 
Believed Zonephone was the nay to Parent ccmapny in financiel trouble; 
build expertise before addressing Investment of E25 million virtually 
potential market opportunities 6bondoned. 
of the next tech. - PCN; Lrwhed with incompatible equipment. 
IERCURY Dec. 1989 Offered a combined technology and Too few base stations; Jvle 1W 
‘allpoint sales package; Poor marketing; 
Planned to charge cells at the same More cannitted to PCN licence? 
from anywhere in the UK; Launched with incompatible equipment. 
Aimed to be nationwide; 
Stressed affordability, accessibility 
and portabi 1 i ty; 
Pushed their reliability. 
lYPS 
abbit 
March 1992 Hoped for a competitive advantage by Too such advertising uithout 6 product, Dec. 1% 
delaying launch until they had CA1 led to customer confusion; 
compatible equipment and nationwide Consirtantly delayed launch dates; Note (c) 
coverage; Take over by Hutchinson in Feb. 1991 
Established brand name early; 
Most powerfully backed operator; 
Highest pre-launch spend; 
Intended to succeed by being a late 
entrant; 
Building custaner base for PCN network. 
Notes on above Table. 
(a) Because of concern that BT would have unfair competitive advantage, their licence wa6 subject to additional conntraintr, 
eg a minority shareholding plus separate billing arrangements. Similar condition6 applied to the consortium containing 
Mercury’6 intereats, but to a lesser extent as it was not dominant in the marketplace. 
(b) BT’6 relaunch was repeatedly delayed, apparently over “technical hitchea” regarding the move to CA1 and beg6 the 
question, why did Phonepoint delay pulling out until October 1991 while continuing to invent in, inntall and advertise a 
product which they knew to be a failure? Perhaps the answer lay with Cellnet - BT’6 cellular subsidiary (BT owned 45% of 
Phonepoint and 60% of Cellnet). Cellnet and Vodafone are cash generators for their parent companies - Telepoint never was 
or would be in that form. Unless vetoed by OFTEL, the 800 BT Phonepoint subscribers were to be given either a refund or 
free cellular handset6 and subscriptions to the cellular system. Cellnet could capture up to 800 new customers in one go! 
(c) BYPS operated a “wait and see policy”. At the first Telepoint Conference (May 1989), BYPS excused its delayed entry 
into the market by stating that:- 
” We cannot go forward on something less than a service which in entirely adequate and deliver6 all that 
connumers require”. [9] 
.- 
-. 
In April 1990 research by the Henley Centre for Forecasting found that despite “post-hype 
pessimism” [lo] there was still potential for mass market phones and forecast that up to 12 
million UK customers could be using some form of mobile communication by the year 1995 [I 1] 
but the major problem was that no-one was willing to invest the millions necessary to alert the 
public to the potential. 
These four consortia had “won” their licences and the right to operate a Telepoint system but 
their problems were just beginning. It was estimated that each consortium would need to invest 
up to ES0 million to install the necessary infrastructure and that at least 20000 base stations (per 
operator) would be required to run an efficient nationwide service. 
COLLABORATIVE STRATEGIES 
Littler and Wilson [12] outline some of the pressures for collaboration that many firms in high 
technology sectors face and they have been summarised below in as far as they apply to the 
Telepoint consortia. 
Desired Outcome Possible Causes 
Market entry. Shorter product life cycles as a consequence of rapid 
technological change results in the need for speedy access to major markets 
and often “narrowing windows of opportunity” [ 131. The window of 
opportunity for Telepoint proceeded to get smaller and smaller. 
Market exit. A way of reducing the cost of exiting from a market by reducing the 
involvement in a collaboration over time, eg Barclay’s reduced their share 
from 33% to 5% when Hutchison took over the BYPS operation. 
Rapid product development. Intense competition and the rate of technological change 
focuses on the need to have short development periods in order to get to 
market quickly. Co-operative arrangements can accelerate the 
commercialisation process of short life technologies. 
Economies of scale. Collaboration spreads the high cost of technical development, 
product design, marketing and infrastructure. It also reduces costs and can 
expand markets through mutual access. This should have been beneficial to 
Ferranti in particular, being a manufacturer as well as a service operator. 
Access to technology and expertise. Allows the exchange of technological 
developments and skills. Some interdependency between technologies means 
that sometimes more can be gained by collaborating than competing. 
Risk reduction. Collaborative alliances are a way of insuring against the very 
high costs of failure - they spread the risk. 
Source: based on Liltler arld Wilson 
In nascent sectors, triggers for initiating alliances could be either tentative - to explore the 
potential; opportunistic - for short term gain; or as commitment - a long term interest in 
developing the sector/market, but most of all it would appear that they must be flexible and 
constantly evolving. By the time BT suspended their service (October 1991) BYPS had still not 
launched and its composition had altered drastically, as had all the consortia (see Appendix 2). It 
may be that the nature of the involvement will be unclear until it develops enough for the 
returns to be more apparent. 
Less than a year after launch (December 1990) merger talks were underway between Mercury 
Callpoint and BYPS who both denied it to be a defensive move. Cable and Wireless would be 
the largest shareholder in the new Mercury company but it would be marketed under the BYPS 
“Rabbit” brand. The proposed deal would have the approval of OFTEL. Cable and Wireless said 
that the combined marketing and technical strengths of the two companies would bring 
substantial benefits to customers. It was also rumoured that BT Phonepoint and Ferranti were 
expected to join forces in an attempt to cut costs. Mergers were having to be considered because 
sales were way below predictions (see Problems page 9). The Government would be embarrassed 
if one arm of its liberalised communications policy failed and operators blamed the lack of 
success on the economic downturn and Government announcements on future licences for PCN 
technology, but there were many more reasons for the poor performance. Having spent more 
than f90 million setting up Telepoint, operators were faced with having to spend much more to 
popularise it. Ferranti could not afford further heavy investment and had failed to sell its 
majority stake. At this time the industry hoped that CA1 handsets due early 1991, enabling users 
to “roam” the networks, would give the system the boost it needed. But in January 1991, talks 
between BYPS and Mercury ended in failure because the two sides could not agree terms and in 
February 1991 Hutchison Telecomm (UK) an arm of Hong Kong’s Li Ka Shing (a branch of 
Hong Kong’s Hutchison Whampoa Group) were negotiating with BYPS to take a controlling 
stake in their Telepoint operation. Hutchison saw great potential in Telepoint when used with a 
paging network, Philips and Shell pulled out completely but Barclays Bank retained a 5% 
holding. This gave the UK subsidiary of the Hong Kong company a hold in the UK 
telecommunications industry just as it was opening up to competition and could enable them to 
launch directly into the European market. 
By July 1991 Ferranti and Mercury were no longer operational and subscriber figures were 
almost impossible to come by - all four networks were reluctant to discuss numbers, which were 
thought to be less than 9000. The market was now effectively down to one operator (BT), with a 
second biding its time in the wings. Interestingly enough this second player was not the obvious 
one but was a very ambitious Hutchison Telecomms (UK). The company had been undertaking a 
“blitzkrieg of UK acquisitions” [ 141 and had already bought the Millicom Paging Company and 
Millicom Cellular, as well as BYPS and in July 1991 they acquired a PCN licence via Microtel. 
COMPETITION 
In the constant search for competitive edge, businesses must continually be engaged in a process 
of improvement, modification and innovation. This is especially important in nascent sectors, 
such as those founded on new technology, where failure to do so could erode the basis on which 
they compete and with so many potential sources of change, result in a loss of competitiveness. 
The mobile communications sector could well be described as nascent, open to the possibility of 
new market opportunities as the PCN and Telepoint technologies developed. Littler and Leverick 
[15] have found such embryonic sectors to be “highly energetic, encountering significant 
technological change, with rapid rates of market development, high rates of product 
obsolescence and considerable uncertainty”. Such sectors also focus on “the technology itself and 
the product rather than the benefits sought by potential customers”. Being so product led (as 
with Telepoint) can blinker the company (or in this case the operators) to the user and 
marketing requirements and eventually result in the failure of the business objectives. 
Competition must not be viewed too narrowly, there is a continual threat of innovation by 
existing or new rivals; from new products which supercede the current offering; or are cheaper 
or better versions of the same. Developments could also arise from as yet unknown or previously 
unconsidered areas. Companies offering advanced technological products must be aware that any 
early advantage they may have established could soon be eroded by new later entrants building 
on the lessons learnt, therefore any marketing position gained must be sustainable against 
existing and new competition. 
Telepoint’s competition came from two sectors, existing telephony (payphones and cellular) and 
from emerging technologies like PCN. 
Payphones 
As Telepoint’s main competitor was the humble Payphone, it would have made sense to position 
it downmarket - aiming at consumers who could not afford cellular but who did want the 
convenience of a “phonebox in their pocket”. But its success was hampered by improvement in 
the service of traditional phoneboxes. When the system was first mooted, working call boxes 
were like “snow in June” then BT undertook an intensive repair programme and improved the 
performance of one of its own competitors. Even so Telepoint was still at a disadvantage, since 
in a call box, calls can be received - not so with a CT2 handset! 
Cellular 
The success of cellular, the first mobile technology to market, led to rapid market growth (from 
46000 subscribers in 1985 to over 1 million in 1991) initially with demand consistently exceeding 
predictions. The sector quickly developed the image of being a highly lucrative market, with 
many companies showing an interest in the developing technologies. As a result, Telepoint and 
PCN licence applications were oversubscribed, with 11 applications for Telepoint and 8 for PCN 
- despite the very high development and infrastructure costs. Cellular’s initial success meant that 
demand exceeded capacity and, too often, many subscribers failed to make their connection. The 
system has been dogged by congestion and poor quality service, despite high rental and call 
charges, thus user dissatisfaction has grown, with recently up to a 2% drop out each month. 
Even so, the cellular sector is now an established market and is beginning to mature. Vodafone 
have a 56% share of the cellular market (92/93) and pre-tax profits were up 11% on 1991/92. 
There was 8% growth in total user numbers during 1991/92 compared with 33% growth during 
1990/91 [16]. Cellular phones initially had the image of belonging to high flying executives 
because of the expense involved both in purchase and in use, but they may have become victims 
of their own success. 
“Although subscribers have exceeded forecasts, call congestion is getting worse, 
interference is bad, battery life is improving only slowly and user frustration 
mounts. Marketers have raised the customer’s expectations to a level that they are 
unable to satisfy.” [ 171 
But in the end, Telepoint could not be a real rival to cellular as it was never truly mobile. 
Competition also came from the threat of emerging or new technologies which would “leapfrog” 
CT2, the most immediate of which was PCN. 
PCN 
In December 1989, with Telepoint struggling to establish itself, the DTI announced the awards 
of the next technology - PCN. This promised to be everything that Telepoint was not, two-way 
and fully mobile. Telepoint was doomed, leapfrogged before it had started. The intention was to 
offer the sophistication and convenience of expensive cellular radio phones but supposedly at a 
lower cost. Licences were awarded to three consortia:- 
Mercury PCN (Cable and Wireless, Motorola, Telefonica Spain), 
Unite1 (STC, Thorn EMI, US West and Deutsche Bundesposte Telekom), 
British Aerospace consortium called Microtel. 
The two existing cellular operators could also turn their services to PCN’s, making a maximum 
of five operators possible. Cellnet and Vodafone had spent over f500 million each on building 
their nationwide networks of base stations. PCN operators were expected to spend up to f 1 
billion each on the infrastructure and in developing digital technology based on GSM for 
compatibility in the European market. Originally scheduled for introduction by 1993, PCN’s will 
not now be available until the mid-1990’s and investment has been cut with Mercury now 
planning to spend around f200 million and concentrate within the M25 region only. 
. . 
In July 1991, the British Aerospace consortium (Microtel) was acquired by Hutchison Telecomm 
(UK) and Mercury and Unite1 merged to form a joint venture, effectively bringing down the 
competing operators in the PCN market to two [see Chart in Appendix]. PCN is the type of 
product that has been referred to as “vapourware” [ 181, a product which does not yet exist, 
although its promised performance would improve on existing technology. The main question to 
be answered was and still is, can the planned PCN’s really produce mobile services cheaply 
enough to compete with fixed line and cellular phones. The operators always believed that it 
would not really compete with the Telepoint system directly, Ed Candy BYPS: 
“There is major confusion concerning the positioning of the PCN and Telepoint 
technologies. PCN is not likely to begin trial systems until at least 1996, by which 
time Telepoint will be an established market”.[l9] 
Roger Best, Phonepoint: 
- 
“PCN is not a competing technology with Telepoint. It will be aimed at the top 
end of the market - competing with cellular. Telepoint is a mass market service 
offering convenience and flexibility at a low price”.[20] 
But it had to be seen as competition and potential customers had to decide whether to buy or 
wait. Analysts at Barclays de Zoete Wedd still believe there will be 10 million UK consumers 
using either cellular or PCN phones by the year 2000. Cellnet and Vodafone already have their 
network and support infrastructure in place and intend to develop technologies to compete with 
the new PCN operators, they are well placed to fight a price war - as soon as a PCN service is 
launched they will simply cut their prices. 
PROBLEMS 
With the benefit of hindsight it is possible to identify 10 problems contributing to the failure of 
the Telepoint system:- 
1) RESTRICTED RANGE AND NUMBER OF BASE STATIONS - Telepoint phones only work 
within range of a base station, unlike cellular, which work throughout the country and between 
cells. The number of locations and the spread of the service would be key to the systems 
success. Despite operators claims, Telepoint’s coverage never competed with cellular or 
payphones and major problems arose over siting. The aim was to have base stations every 500 
meters in cities and every 10 minutes along motorways, but in reality they were very limited, 
concentrated only in central London and along the major motorway routes. The failure to 
establish a national network before launch was one of the main reasons for collapse. The 
estimated minimum coverage for an efficient nationwide service was said to be 20,000 base 
stations per operator - the approximate number on closure were, Mercury 2500; BT 3300; no 
figures were available for Ferranti. Phonepoint subscriptions were so low after 8 months that it 
was thought to have more base stations than subscribers! (as it indeed did have on closure). 
2) POOR IMAGE - From very early on Telepoint was seen as a commercial flop and 
quickly acquired an image of failure. It attracted such terms as “skodaphone” “second class 
product” “lacklustre image” and “a dodo. I”. The “call box in your pocket” was originally marketed 
as a “poor man’s cellphone” - this was enough to kill it at birth. This negative image had the 
knock on effect of making potential site providers unwilling to become associated, they did not 
want to be seen to promote something deemed to be a failure. 
3) INCOMPATIBILITY - Government made it clear at the outset that operators had to 
support the CA1 standard by 1991 (see definition section) however, three operators launched 
with incompatible equipment aiming to get in early and capture a large slice of the emerging 
market. This meant that initially handsets only worked with each operator’s proprietory 
equipment: after 1991 it would be mandatory for handsets to have access to any operators base 
stations to enable inter-system “roaming”. BYPS maintained that their delayed launch was 
because they would wait as long as necessary to be able to launch with CA1 standard equipment. 
International standardisation is also an issue as the appeal of the service would be enhanced if 
one handset could also be used in overseas. 
4) ONE WAY ONLY (CT2 technology) - A major disadvantage for the customer was the 
inability to receive incoming calls - a restriction imposed by the DTI after lobbying by the 
cellular operators. With one-way communication, it was perceived to be inferior to its 
competitors. The DTI belatedly realised its mistake and approved handsets with built in pagers 
in mid-1990 but it was too late to make any difference. 
5) LACK OF MARKETING AND CONFUSION IN THE MIND OF THE CUSTOMER - With 
a proliferation of products, including static phones, cellular radio phones, Telepoint and the idea 
of the personal communicators (PCN’s), potential customers were confused. By Christmas 1990 
only 6% of consumers asked had ever heard of Telepoint [21] and even less knew what it was. 
Ian Reece, Communications Consultant at BIS Mackintosh said..... 
“Telepoint has acquired an air of failure, the lack of promotion has been a 
marketing disaster”.[22] 
and the Financial Times stated “Telepoint is undergoing an identity crisis”. [23] 
Moriarty and Kosnik [l] have found that high technology marketing mishaps and many product 
casualties occur when basic marketing lessons have not been learnt, such as: 
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- market selection, choosing the right customer to serve. 
- marketing concept,identifying and satisfying unmet needs. 
- differentiation, how to fill a particular need better than the competition. 
- 4 P’s marketing mix. 
The lack of marketing was a very real problem for this product. All the operators had grossly 
under-estimated the advice and marketing needed to explain the system to the public, 
competition was fierce, sales tactics dubious and some of the technology unsatisfactory. 
Communications consultants sprung up overnight and early on there was confusion among the 
salespeople. It was a real chicken and egg situation - explaining precisely why anyone should 
buy such a restricted system called for intensive marketing, but the more the public learnt about 
it, the more obvious its limitations became - could this be why the operators did not go out of 
their way to fully explain and market the technology ? Critics (including David Willis an 
Independent Communication Consultant in an FT Survey [24]) argued that the operators 
effectively missed the boat by failing to market the service properly and that they would not be 
able to re-establish themselves in the UK’s increasingly competitive mobile marketplace. 
Potential customers were uninformed and confused and the product was still too expensive for 
the market at which it was aimed, but operators always insisted that the market was on the 
point of taking off! 
In their haste to go into operation, those launching pre-CA1 did much to confuse potential users 
and base station providers, since post-CA1 all hardware would have to be replaced (base stations 
and handsets). Having four operators in the market proved to be a great test of the open market 
principle, it always seemed unlikely that the market could support all four but if two or more 
had succeeded in offering compatibility from the start then some user frustration and confusion 
could have been averted. 
BYPS Rabbit spent the most on their marketing - but had still not launched when all three 
competitors had failed. Launch dates were put back time and time again and talk of trial 
launches (by all operators) signalled to would-be subscribers that Telepoint’s future was by no 
means certain and added to the confusion, Cooper [25] cites poor execution of a new product’s 
launch as one reason for a product’s ultimate failure. The dismal awareness figures for Telepoint 
post-launch, would appear to back this up. 
Rothwell’s study [26] finds that one particular failure of innovating companies is associated with 
the “we know best” attitude when they fail to acknowledge the need to consult potential users 
concerning their invention. McKenna [27] goes as far the other way in suggesting that they 
should - 
“integrate the customer into the design process to guarantee a product tailored to 
customer needs and marketplace requirements”. 
This appears to be conspicuous by its absence in the sector under consideration and not the 
normal marketing route for high technology companies. Instead, supply-side markets, as 
identified by Shanklin and Ryans [28] follow Say’s law, which states that the supply of a 
product can create its own demand. This is contrary to the conventional marketing wisdom of 
devising offerings to fill demands or needs and mainly seems to occur in high technology 
industries, where by nature the products have not existed before. Technical progress can create 
market demand which relies on a “presumptive need” rather than an identification of buyers’ 
desires. In these cases the marketing strategy tends to be formulated on sketchy market 
information and sometimes even on intuition. 
Shanklin and Ryans [29] found that supply-side conditions dominate the early stages of 
marketing most high technology products and that industry shakeouts and later entrants signal an 
evolution to more demand driven marketing as the product/technology/market begins to mature. 
With this change, the marketing role becomes more traditional, requiring a change in 
organisational thinking, but the problem with fast moving technology markets is that the 
market/product/company may not last long enough for this change to take place. The main error 
therefore, for poorly marketed high technology products seems to go back to companies being 
product/technology led rather than market led. Bill BonDurant (Marketing Director, Hewlett 
Packard) comments:- 
’ Most new products fail for marketing reasons, not for technological reasons. We 
can do what we set out to do, it’s just that frequently what we decide to do is 
not what the market wants” [30]. 
This ties in very nicely with a quote from Graham Wilde, (communications research organisation 
CIT); - “Telepoint is a bit of a dead end, it is a technology led initiative - they found they could 
do it, but there is not much use for it!” [31]. Often, enthusiasm for the technology, the need to 
respond quickly to a market opportunity and to establish a position in an emerging sector puts 
marketing considerations low down on the list of business priorities, this is far removed from 
Regis McKenna’s view that marketing is everything and should evolve as the technology evolves 
v51. 
6) GOVERNMENT - Strategic blunders by the operators were exacerbated by inconsistent 
Government action. Unhappy with the cosy duopoly that had developed in the cellular market 
(Vodafone and Cellnet) and the conventional market (BT and Mercury) the Government was 
keen to stimulate competition, but new technologies such as CT2 needed nurturing, not to be 
thrown open to market forces. To have four different operators spending all their energies 
fighting each other over sites and charges, resulted in rash claims and a rush to market. The 
Government then shot Telepoint in the foot by announcing its technological successor (PCN’s) 
on the very day that the Telepoint licences were awarded, which effectively marked it as an 
interim product and rendered it obsolete before it had begun. 
“A major cause of the Telepoint failure was the Government going overboard 
with the launch of PCN. It deterred further investment, pushed the operators into 
launching too early and stopped customers buying”.[32] 
CIT Research Consultancy have also placed some of the blame for the failure of Telepoint 
firmly in the lap of the Government and feel that the DTI should only have granted one 
licence.[33] 
7) TARGETING/POSITIONING - Telepoint was initially expected to address a new market 
(it is not clear how much research was done on this) - an emerging niche of people who felt the 
need for more mobile personal communication, for example women and older people who were 
becoming increasingly concerned about personal safety and a more mobile population of both 
business and domestic users would result in a growing need for mobile communication with 
family, friends and associates. As Shanklin and Ryans demonstrate [34] techniques of identifying 
customer needs and targetting market segments are most suited to market situations in which the 
producer can identify the broad user groups for each new product. However, with truly 
innovative new products, as already illustrated, there is usually no existing market demand from 
which to gather such information and to formulate strategies. 
CT2 phones or “the phone box irt your pocket” were originally designed to be a low cost 
alternative to the cellular network but really competed with the telephone box. By positioning 
itself in this way it could only make limited inroads, with only a few thousand customers, whilst 
cellular had over one million. Industry observers say that this indicates that CT2 was positioned 
in the wrong market-place from the beginning. The fundamental problem was that the industry 
had the technology but did not know who it was aimed at. The operators said they were not 
targetting cellular customers, as they believed this market would be taken over by PCN’s, but 
charges were nearer to cellular than to the fixed network or payphones. There was a basic 
mismatch between the image and the product, in that even though it was being marketed as the 
poor man’s mobile phone - it was overpriced for the target market (see also 10 Mispricing). 
8) LIMITED LIFE CYCLE - Operators believed that CT2 had 5-7 years before it would be 
overtaken by the next technology (PCN). This time span would be necessary to become 
established in the market, consolidate their position, improve their services and reduce costs. 
However, it soon became obvious that the window of opportunity was not that long and that it 
would be leapfrogged by new technologies before it had time to reach the volume of sales 
required to reduce prices significantly. In the event, other issues forced the operators out of 
business before the technology even became established. 
Faster new product development and speed to market is becoming more important, as it has 
been acknowledged that product life cycles (PCL’s) are getting shorter, [35], [36]. Moriarty and 
Kosnik [I] however, have found no evidence that high technology PCL’s in particular, are 
getting any shorter than more traditional products, but did find evidence that all PCL’s are 
becoming shorter. Shanklin and Ryans [29] have determined that the concept of a PLC - 
whereby a new product is introduced commercially and then proceeds through predictable life 
cycle stages until it dies or is terminated, can be grossly misleading for high technology 
products. It is not always apparent where such products are in their life cycles at a given time 
and the market turbulence of such sectors makes the idea of forecastable life cycles tenuous at 
best. In such sectors it is the technology life cycle that is crucial. A company must continually 
monitor and evaluate objectively how its technologies are performing in the marketplace and 
how they could perform against rival technologies. 
- 
- 
9) NOT TRULY MOBILE - Telepoint technology does not permit users to make calls on the 
move, as there is no hand over facility to allow a call made on one base station to be switched 
over to another, but you can move within range of a base station. The system was officially 
classed as not mobile when it was exempt from the mobile telephone tax, as imposed in the 1991 
Budget statement. It is therefore difficult to see how it could have been marketed as a form of 
mobile telecommunication. 
- 
10) MISPRICING - The operators faced a dilemma over pricing. Like conventional and 
cellular operators, Telepoint companies expected their principle source of income to come from 
call charges - this meant building up a large subscriber base as quickly as possible. The best way 
to do this would have been to sell the handsets at manufacturing price or less. However, the 
backing companies had invested such large sums in the networks, that they were naturally keen i- 
to recoup their investment by charging more for the hardware. So they chose to try and l 
maximise handset profit. In asking around f200 (the same as the cheapest cellphone) predictably I- 
there were few takers - price falls followed but too late - what consumer interest there had I 
been had died. This is one area that Hutchison would have to address in order to be successful 
’ Hutchison will probably have to give handsets away, if the market for Telepoint I- 
with its history of problems, is to take off in the current climate”.[37] Ian Reece, 
Telecom analyst BIS. 
CURRENT SITUATION 
BYPS was bought out by Hutchison Telecomms (UK) in February 1991. They sat back and 
watched the other operators rush to market - Neil1 Macklin, Hutchison’s Marketing Director 
stated;- “The lessons have been learnt” [33]. Rabbit (cockney slang for chatting) was launched in 
Manchester in March 1992, the Granada TV region in July 1992 and hoped to be national by 
the end of 1993. 
The company adopted very different strategies from its failed competitors:- 
a) They planned to go back to a system based on PA Technology’s original concept of 
marketing it as an alternative to fixed office and home phones, with the advantage that it could 
.- 
also be used in the street. Hutchison saw this as the biggest missed opportunity, other operators 
concentrated on street communication when there were already two strong markets for improved 
mobile communications - home and office. The ability to use a home or office phone in the 
street became a bonus, not the main selling point. 
b) They intended to delay national launch until the service could be used in almost any 
town or city in the UK. This would require at least 12000 base stations. In the regions where it 
was piloted there was extensive press and TV advertising, home calls and street trials. They 
continued to use high profile marketing. 
c) Hutchison also hold a licence for PCN (via Microtel) and own a national paging 
operation. In a shrewd move, they see “Rabbit” as a pathfinder for PCN and by building 
(hopefully) a large subscriber list for their Telepoint network, they will encourage these 
customers to upgrade to PCN when it does arrive - giving them a head start in the PCN market. 
Six weeks after the Manchester launch, Rabbit had over 1000 subscribers and latest published 
figures (May 1993) showed that they had approx 10000 customers (Ref Hutchison PR Agency 
l/6/93) compared with predictions of 50000 [38]. Instead of targetting the business market, 
Rabbit aimed at lower socio-economic groups who they hoped were still eager for mobile 
communication. They had what they believed to be an improved product offering, the handset 
and base station was to retail at between f 199 and f240 and could be linked to a pager 
(optional) for use in the home, office or street. The overall cost of a Rabbit system was between 
a half and a third that of cellular, however, some sceptics believed it to be “doomed from the 
outset to suffer the commercial equivalent of terminal myxomatosis” but Peter Wright MD 
remained convinced there was a niche in the market: 
“Thanks to some good judgement and a little luck we can now succeed where all 
three of our Telepoint competitors failed miserably”. [39] 
He hoped that by being patient, Rabbit would reap the rewards of being the only player left in 
a potential mass market for basic mobile telephony. 
However, Hutchison Telecomm’s Rabbit service ceased at midnight on December 31st 1993. 
Carrying losses reported to be f 122 million, they closed with 9000 customers and 1200 base 
stations. 
LESSONS LEARNT 
It is important to assess the failure of Telepoint in terms of lessons learnt, regarding the 
introduction of new products in nascent and growing sectors. With hindsight, it is possible to 
look at the issue from three perspectives, leadership and followership; market and technological 
uncertainty and risk evaluation and see how it fits into theoretical frameworks already 
established in each area. 
LEADERSHIP AND FOLLOWERSHIP 
The advantages of being technological leaders are to set standards for the industry; use the 
opportunity to exploit a new niche with initially few competitors; move from technology 
leadership to market leadership and ultimately make money. But with leadership comes many 
problems, high cost; high risk; instability; the need for management commitment; it is research 
intensive; with high resource use; technology push without market pull. 
“Although pioneers take the greatest risks and are shaken out in the greatest 
numbers - those that survive can be well rewarded, early entrants must bear the 
costs but they have the opportunity to define the rules of competition to their 
advantage.“[40] 
As far back as 1967, Ansoff and Stewart [41] identified the perils of leadership as “risking large 
investments of time and money in technical and market development without any immediate 
return. The company must be able to absorb mistakes, withdrawal and recuperation without 
losing its position in other product lines”. The three Telepoint leaders who rushed to market 
faced these perils and ultimately had to deal with large losses. Ferranti especially has felt the 
full effects of withdrawal from a market in which it had a large stake in the original 
technological innovation and Mercury may face increased competition for its second place in the 
market behind BT. 
” Technology leaders tend to become technology losers”.[42] 
Rothwell has found [26] that early participants in the development of high technology sectors 
often provide opportunities for later entrants to learn from the experience of the pioneers and 
become more successful. Followers can therefore, enter a market quickly either with a very 
similar product or with new or improved technology and vie for the leadership position, like 
Mercury, or they could be content to be second but better with the emphasis on development 
rather than research. Late followers are not really innovators but learn from the pioneers and try 
to improve the product offering, like Hutchison, they have to decide whether to out-imitate the 
pioneer or try to leapfrog by launching a new version. 
” Follow the leader strategies try to learn from the innovators’ mistakes, so as to 
develop an improved, more reliable product that may well include “advanced 
features” whilst avoiding entirely those product attributes which proved to be 
market failures”.[43] 
After the withdrawal of all three operators in 1991, the market was left open and being the only 
licensee left in the running, Hutchison were under no competitive pressure to rush to market 
and were said to be “testing the system to destruction”. Marketing Director Neil1 Macklin 
believed that by biding its time Rabbit would launch with the right product (with the potential 
for worldwide compatibility) with a solid infrastructure and at the right price. 
.- 
MARKET AND TECHNOLOGICAL UNCERTAINTY 
As previously stated in the introduction to this paper, defining high technology products and 
industries presents its own problems. In most modern industries, technology embodies product 
technology (embedded in the product itself), process technology (part of the production/delivery 
system) and management technology (knowledge of how to market the product and run the 
business) [44]. Shanklin and Ryans [34] definition of a high technology company is based on 
three criteria:- the business requires a strong scientific technical base; new technologies can 
quickly make existing technologies obsolete; and as new technologies come on stream, their 
application can create or revolutionise markets and demand. Whilst Moriarty and Kosnik [l] 
define high technology marketing as marketing situations in which both the market and 
technology uncertainties are high. 
Market uncertainty is when the market is ambiguous about the kinds and extent of the needs to 
be satisfied - it is impossible to know what the market wants if the technology is not in place. 
In very new (nascent) markets, customers themselves are unsure about the potential uses and 
benefits of a developing technology - eg many early adopters were unsure what they would use 
their first home computer for - a basic lack of understanding of the technology is not always 
the customer’s fault. Without a track record for the product, there can be no certain knowledge 
of its potential uses or market, therefore it is very difficult to predict future sales or forecast 
market size. Thus, uncertainties in these sectors take many forms, but particularly surround the 
product specification’s acceptability to customers; the intensity and amount of competition; 
pricing and positioning and defining a market segment. 
Technological uncertainty, on the other hand is not knowing if a technology can meet a set of 
needs in a better way than an alternative, ie what benefit did Telepoint offer over and above its 
main competitors. This type of uncertainty is often based around a lack of information, 
- about the reliability of the technology 
- about the product’s functional performance 
- over delivery patterns 
- technical obsolescence - whether and when a newer technology will come onto the 
market 
- difficulties in forecasting market response 
- unproved ability to make sales 
- uncertain return on large investment 
- doubts over realising the technology’s potential. 
It would seem proven therefore that high technology products and suppliers are by definition 
dealing with uncertainty and as a consequence involve to a greater or lesser degree, an element 
of risk. Many companies would acknowledge that risk exists yet do not account for it in their 
strategic planning or in the marketing process. 
RISK EVALUATION 
It should be a crucial task of such companies to define these risks and look for ways in which 
the customers perception of risk could be reduced or to effect Shankleman’s “worry 
minimisation”[45]. Research undertaken by Millman and Meldrum [46] has identified 10 areas 
of risk which “can substantially impact upon the potential success of high technology ventures”. 
These have been looked at in the context of the Telepoint failure. 
INADEQUATE TECHNOLOGY - will it work, will it deliver what is required, has it been 
launched before all the problems (technical hitches) are 
ironed out. With Telepoint this proved to be the case in 
that calls were one-way only, there were problems over the 
short range use to base stations and the technology was not 
truly mobile. It was not sufficient to sell this product on 
the success of cellular technology alone. 
NOT AN ACCEPTABLE SUBSTITUTE - is the product an acceptable substitute to existing 
products that fulfil the same function - in this case cellular 
and payphones. What are the additional benefits above the 
existing offerings? If the answer is very little then this 
means that initial market penetration is likely to be slow 
and great investment may be required to convert 
technological success into commercial success. 
“The fundamental question to be asked of any new 
technology is, what does this offer over and above other 
inventions that are already on the market - in the case of 
Telepoint the answer is nothing, it falls spectacularly 
between two stools.” [47] 
SPECIFICATION DRIFT - this occurs when customer or Government specifications 
change during the development cycle. This makes the 
forecasting of costs and deadlines very difficult. With 
Telepoint, problems over handset weights, paging 
attachments, standards for roaming requirements and 
design modifications pushed costs up and deadlines were 
passed, ie BT relaunch. 
TECHNICAL LEAPFROGGING - this is when an existing technology is overtaken or 
leapfrogged by a substitute or new generation of the same 
technology. This occurred with the promise of CT2+, CT3 
and PCN, leaving a very small window of opportunity in 
which to exploit Telepoint, making customers unwilling to 
buy with a new, better version around the corner. 
CREDIBILITY - Millman and Meldrum cite this in two ways, the 
credibility of the technology itself and the credibility of 
the organisations offering it. With Telepoint the lack of 
credibility was down to a very poor image from its 
beginning (see page 10) mainly due to the absence of or 
inconsistencies in marketing. Companies with a credible 
reputation tend to be favoured by purchasers facing high 
risk decisions and BT especially, pushed their leadership in 
the fixed phone market as being an important consideration 
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TIME SCALE FOR PROJECTED SALES - with market uncertainty all forecasts made have 
to be taken with a degree of optimism. Telepoint was 
originally forecast to have 3.6 million subscribers, BYPS to 
launch by 1992 and PCN’s to be introduced by 1993! 
Deadlines were put further and further back. Very often 
selling takes much longer than projected and Telepoint 
seems to have had distribution channel problems as many 
people had problems in tracking down where to go to 
purchase. 
STANDARDS - these could be informal, non-existent or incompatible. In 
this case, problems over CA1 led to a rush to market 
without waiting for the standard, resulting in 
incompatibility between systems and the inability to roam. 
CUSTOMER MISMANAGEMENT OF TECHNOLOGY OR CONFUSION - Problems over the 
standards issue, a lack of marketing and technical 
information and promises of even newer technologies, led 
to total confusion in customer’s minds over what was on 
offer, with very low awareness about both the technology 
(CT2) and the product (Telepoint). 
COST/TIME OVERRUNS - Sometimes original specifications cannot be met without 
running into cost or time overruns. This can be due to 
many factors including, production problems, distribution 
channels, the technology itself and HR problems. It usually 
occurs in the early stages of development. Telepoint tried 
to overcome these by rushing out an incompatible product 
to capture market share, only to have to deal later with 
problems of adapting both the product and the 
infrastructure once the CA1 standard became mandatory in 
1991. 
LACK OF INFRASTRUCTURE - the supporting technology must be adequate if the 
proposed product is to be a worthwhile purchase. It is not 
viable if the industry has to wait for enabling technologies 
or if the concepts are promised ahead of reality (as with 
PCN). With Telepoint the infrastructure was one of the 
main problems. It had to be built from scratch, operators 
underestimated the costs and time involved and it proved 
to be pointless launching without full national coverage. 
CONCLUSION 
It is easy to see the implications of all these risks with the benefit of hindsight but this does not 
get away from the necessity of incorporating risk management strategies into any project 
involving new product development and launch. I would argue that with Telepoint some of these 
risks (infrastructure, standards, marketing) presented such obvious stumbling blocks that 
ignoring them was blatantly courting failure. Only when the full range of potential threats are 
successfully identified and plans made to deal with such contingencies, can companies involved 
in technology based industries develop strategies to successfully bring their products to market. 
With the withdrawal of the last operator in the market (December 1993) the Telepoint concept is 
now dead. This failure highlights how the emphasis on a technological development which was 
at best interim, allowed the companies involved to make the classic error of believing that a 
clever technology would sell itself and thus require little attention to customer needs and values 
- new providers will ignore marketing at their peril and must build in risk evaluation if newer 
technologies are not to suffer the same fate as CT2. 
“All this was a lesson in how to bungle a brilliant opportunity’j481. 
Optimism has been a feature of the telecommunications market since the success of cellular 
phones but with the drawbacks of the product itself, its short life cycle and very little market 
research or support, the only surprising thing is that Telepoint made it to the marketplace at all! 
.- 
APPENDIX 1 
DEFINITIONS 
CT1 
These were the first domestic cordless telephones which allowed the user to be up to 300 meters 
(indoors or outdoors) from the transmitter/reception point. 
CT2 
“Portable phone box” second generation cordless telephony, enabled outgoing calls to be made within 
range of low powered antennae, located at base stations in public areas - UK Telepoint service. 
CT2 plus 
An enhanced version of CT2, allowing users to make and receive calls - under trial in Canada by 
Ericsson. 
CT3 
Developed by Ericsson of Sweden, similar to CT2 plus but with more features and at a higher cost. 
Pager 
Pagers receive radio signals generated by public or private telephone services then emit a signal 
indicating a call or display an alpha/numeric message. 
GSM 
Groupe Speciale Mobile, the name to describe the latest cellular radio service. It uses digital 
transmission and as the same frequencies have been allocated across Europe, eventually this will enable 
calls to be made from one handset to anywhere in Europe. 
Common Air Interface (CAI) 
CA1 is the Government standard regulating the way signals pass between handsets and base stations. It 
was made clear at the outset that all operators would have to conform to this standard after 1991. This 
was to ensure that users of one network would be able to gain access to other networks, eg a Callpoint 
handset could make calls from a Phonepoint base station (known as Inter-System Roaming) without any 
restrictive agreements. Although making life more convenient for Telepoint users, the move to CA1 
added to the complexity of the infrastructure, as systems had to be put into place (both in the hardware 
and the software) to ensure compatibility and to calculate who to bill for which calls. However, three 
operators (Mercury, BT and Ferranti) launched their services without waiting for CA1 equipment to 
become available, thus the networks were incompatible. The CA1 standard has been defined so a single 
handset should be able to access public and private Telepoint base stations, PCN’s and GSM’s. The 
ultimate intention was for Telepoint and GSM to converge in a third generation service (CT3) to be 
introduced by the year 2000. 
Cellular 
Cellular phones use radio signals to transfer calls to any fixed or mobile phone in the area served by 
either of the two UK cellular operators, Cellnet and Vodafone. Each network divides the country into 
cells - areas as small as one kilometre in radius, that are each equipped with a base station, controlling 
a low powered radio transmitter and receiver. Calls are received at these base stations and passed to 
regional exchanges, which either connect them to the fixed line network or to another base station if 
the call is to another cellular phone. This is true mobile technology as it allows calls to continue as 
callers travel between cells. 
PCN - Personal Communications Networks 
PCN’s are a development of cellular radio technology. Both operate on the basis of a national network 
of base stations contained within cells. Calls received at base stations are passed onto regional exchanges 
then connected to fixed line networks or another cell. PCN transmitters will operate at higher 
frequency ranges than cellular (between 1.8 and 1.9 gigahertz) enabling them to carry more data in 
smaller cells. Future European services are being developed at around 2 gigahertz (again higher than 
cellular) which allows for smaller, cheaper handsets, using less battery power than cellular radio. This 
technology is still in the product development stage. It will be mobile and have two-way calling ability. 
OVERVIEW OF THE TELEPOINT AND PCN MARKET 
TELEPOINT PCN 
Launched Sept. 1989 
British Telecom 45% 
Deutsch Bund. 10% 
Abandoned Ott 199 1 
Launched Oct. 1989 ei ~~~izY9tkY~,dy 199l 
Launched Dec. 1989 vi Abandoned June 1991 
UNITEL 
Northern Telecom (STC) 
Thorn EMI 
US West 
Deutsch Bund. 
Mercury Personal 
Communications 
MICROTEL 
Millicom (left) 
~$-aA~r-e) 
Pacific Telesis 
Sony 
l Acquired in July 1991 
HUTCI-IISON TELECOM (UK) 
PACTEL, MILLICOM, SONY & 
MATIU all sold to Br. Ae. 
Brit Ae. has 30% stake in the 
Hutchison operation. 
Barclays retained 
5% in Hutchlson 
*I 
F\BC\&lLD~NED DCC . lci93 
MERCURY CALLPOINT 
Mercury’s minimm charge is one minute and calls are charged 
in 30 set increments thereafter. 
There are 3 time periods:- 
ECONOMY- Mon-Fri 6pn to 7.30am. ail day Sat and Sun 
STANDARD- Hon-Fri lpa to 6pn 
PEAK- Man-Fri 7.30am to lpn 
[CALL TYPE 
Calls within UK 
( EcoNcw 1 STANDARD [PEAK 
lOP 16~ 2OP 
FERRANTI ZONEPHONE 
Unlike the other operators, vnicn cnar;e a differen; amount 
per minute of call depending on tne rime of day ana uhere you 
are,Ferranti charges for calls in the same way that 31 does. 
A unit is a set price,uhich varies whether your calls originate 
from within the M2S (12.5~ per unit) or not (lop per unit). 
Time alLoued in sets for each dialled call unit is:- 
CALL TYPE I CHEAP I STANOARD 1 PEAK 1 
Local 330 85 60 
National (a) -’ 96 3k.3 25.7 
National (bl) 60 30 22.5 
National (b) L5 22 18 
Mobile (m) 12 8 8 
Irish Rep 12 8 8 
Joining Fee 25.00 Direct debit 
30.00 other forms of payment 
Monthly Service Charge 8.33 (LID), 10.00 tofp) 
Itemised billing 1.66 
CHEAP - Man-Fri bpm-8pm, all day Sat and Sun 
STANDARD -non-Fri 8am-Pam, and lpm-6pn 
PEAK- Mon- Fri 9am-Tpm 
I 
BT PHONEPOINT 
BT calls are charged in 2 time periods, Off peak and Standard, 
as well as Local and national tariffs. 
All calls are charges in units of one minute. 
CALL TYPE 
Loca 1 
IOFF-PEAK 1 STANDARD I 
TOP 13P 
National 25~ 
Other calls 55P 
Europe 1.00 
Outside Europe 1.60 
Joining fee 20.00 
Monthly service charge 8.00 
Monthly itemised billing 1.00 
30P 
85~ 
1.00 
1.60 
PAYPHONES 
Standard rate of lop per unit, depending on place and time. 
CHEAP RATE- Hon-Fri @n-&m and all weekend 
STANDARD- Man-Fri 8am-9am and lpn-6pm 
PEAK- Hon- fri 9am to lpn 
CALL TYPE ICHEAP 
Local 120 
National a (up fo 35 mLS)81.8 
National bl (over 35mls.I 51.5 
National b 38.8 
ISTANDARD [PEAK ] (in seconds) 
a5 60 
35.1 26.2 
31 23.2 
2L.a 18.6 
CELLULAR PHONES 
Car phones 
Hand portables 
Connection 
Monthly charge 
Calls, 
inside M25 (peak) 
outside M25 (peak) 
any other time 
Itemised billing 
CELLMET ~VOOAFONE 1 
75.00 
399-600 199.00 
65.00 50.00 
25.00 25.00 
35p 33p (1 min), 16.5 every 30 sets 
25~ 25p (1 min),12.5 every 30 sets 
12p lop (1 min), Sp every 30 sets 
2.50 every month Free of charge DD 
10.00 one off 2.50 ofp 
CELLNET 
PEAK - Non-Sat Barn-1Opm 
any other time - Off peak 
VDDAFONE 
PEAK- 7.30am-9.30pn non- Sat 
any other time - Off peak 
OPERATORS PACKAGE AND HARDWARE COSTS AS AT JANUARY 1991 
iMERCURY /BT IZONEPHONd BYPS 
Handset Price 
Base unit 
Package Price 
Itemised BiLling 
Handset Weight 
99.95 
129.95 
25.00 pm 
1.50 pm 
1309 
170.00 200.00 199.9s 
170.00 235.00 218.50 
245.00 210.00 None 
1 .OO pm 5.00 qr N/K 
1309 2709 2309 
MERCURY:- The package is for monthly rentaL incorporating a nuwric 
paw, so that user knows to call out. (Cost is less than for 
pager alone). 
BT PHONEPOINT:- This includes the handset, joining fee and 3 months 
subscription. 
ZONEPHONE:- The purchase package includes handset, charger, enrolement 
and the first years subscription. 
Rental packages were only available from Zonephone direct, purchase 
via dealers. 
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